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9 Counsel for Defendant
10 AMAZON.COM, INC.

11 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
12 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

13
14 CEIVA OPCO, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company,
15
16 Plaintiff,
17 v.
18 AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
19 Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 2:22-cv-02709-AB-MAA

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
OF DEFENDANT AMAZON.COM,
INC. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
INVALIDITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
AND NON-INFRINGEMENT**

Date: January 12, 2024

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Judge: Andre Birotte Jr.

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 12, 2024 at 10:00 am, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, defendant Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) will and hereby does move this Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for summary judgment that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,442,573 (“’573 patent”), 9,203,930 (“’930 patent”), 9,654,562, and 9,124,656 (“’656 patent”) are invalid and not infringed.

Plaintiff Ceiva Opco, LLC (“Ceiva”) asserts claims 2, 6, and 19 of the ’573 patent, claims 1-8 and 15 of the ’930 patent, claims 1-2 and 5-8 of the ’656 patent, and claims 1, 4, 11, 16-17, and 20 of the ’562 patent. All asserted claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter as a matter of law and thus invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. There is also no genuine dispute that Amazon does not infringe at least claim 2 of the ’573 patent, claims 1-8 and 15 of the ’930 patent, claims 1-2 and 5-8 of the ’656 patent, and claim 17 of the ’562 patent, because, among other things, Ceiva accuses an authentication protocol that it disclaimed during prosecution of the asserted patents.

Amazon bases this motion on this notice, the supporting memorandum and points and authorities, the supporting Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“SUF”), the reply in support thereof, the arguments of counsel, and any other evidence that may be presented at the hearing on this matter.

Pursuant to Local Rule 7-3, counsel for Amazon conferred with counsel for Ceiva regarding this motion on November 15, 2023, and Ceiva opposes the relief sought by this motion.

1 Dated: November 22, 2023

Respectfully submitted,
FENWICK & WEST LLP

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4 By: /s/ Ravi R. Ranganath

5 Ravi Ranganath

6 Counsel for Defendant
7 AMAZON.COM, INC.
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FENWICK & WEST LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

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Ex. No.	Description
1.	Order re Amazon’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint in <i>Ceiva Logic, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.</i> , No. 2:19-cv-09129-AB (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2020) (Dkt. No. 48) (“101 Order”)
2.	Order Granting Amazon’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in <i>Ceiva Logic, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.</i> , No. 2:19-cv-09129-AB (C.D. Cal. March 16, 2022) (Dkt. No. 206)
3.	Opening Expert Report of David B. Johnson, Ph.D.
4.	Rebuttal Expert Report of David B. Johnson, Ph.D.
5.	Infringement Expert Report of Stephen A. Edwards, Ph.D.
6.	Rebuttal Expert Report of William C. Easttom II, Ph.D.
7.	Ceiva’s Fifth Amended and Supplemental Interrogatory Responses
8.	Deposition Transcript of Dean Schiller (Volume 1)
9.	Deposition Transcript of Stephen A. Edwards, Ph.D. (Volume 1)
10.	Deposition Transcript of Stephen A. Edwards, Ph.D. (Volume 2)
11.	Deposition Transcript of William C. Easttom II, Ph.D.
12.	File History of U.S. Patent No. 9,203,930
13.	U.S. Patent No. 6,721,713 (“Guheen”)
14.	Draft Specification for The SSL Protocol Version 3.0
15.	Specification for RFC 5246 - The TLS Protocol Version 1.2
16.	Specification for RFC 8446 - The TLS Protocol Version 1.3
17.	Tim Dierks, <i>Security Standards and Name Changes in the Browser Wars</i> , May 23, 2014
18.	Stephen Jan, Paolo de Dios, and Stephen A. Edwards, <i>Porting a Network Cryptographic Service to the RMC2000: A Case Study in Embedded Software Development</i>
19.	<i>Push Servers: The Intranet Channel</i> , 156 PC Magazine, June 10, 1997

Dkt. No.	Description
28-1	U.S. Patent No. 6,442,573
28-2	U.S. Patent No. 9,203,930
28-3	U.S. Patent No. 9,654,562
28-4	U.S. Patent No. 9,124,656

¹ Exhibits 1-19 are attached to the Declaration of Ravi R. Ranganath filed concurrently herewith.

I. INTRODUCTION

Ceiva asserts four patents in this case. The patents are related, share an identical specification, and claim the idea of a digital picture frame that automatically accesses a remote data repository. In the earlier case between Amazon and another Ceiva entity, the Court concluded, after reviewing three of the four asserted patents (the fourth was not asserted in that case), that this idea was abstract and comparable to the age-old practice of compiling photos to display in succession, such as on a film projector. The Court declined to hold the patents invalid on the pleadings alone, however, citing a potential fact dispute as to whether the claims recite an inventive ordered combination. The parties have now developed a complete factual record, and no genuine dispute remains: the asserted claim limitations do not recite an inventive concept, individually or in combination. Instead, the claims recite existing, well-understood, routine, and conventional components and functional limitations for which the patents provide no technological solution. Under a long line of Federal Circuit cases, such patents are invalid under § 101 as a matter of law.

Not only are the claims invalid, but Amazon does not infringe them. For nearly all asserted claims, Ceiva accuses server authentication—a client device verifying the identity of a server with which it communicates—using the TLS security protocol. But it is undisputed that TLS is substantively identical to the predecessor SSL protocol that Ceiva expressly disclaimed from the scope of the patents during prosecution. Ceiva’s infringement claims therefore fail as a matter of law.

II. THE ASSERTED PATENTS

Ceiva asserts four related patents in this case: Nos. 6,442,573 (“’573 patent”), 9,203,930 (“’930 patent”), 9,654,562 (“’562 patent”), and 9,124,656 (“’656 patent”) (collectively, the “asserted patents”). The patents share a common specification and list the same inventors.² (*See* Dkt. No. 28 (First Am. Compl.) ¶ 63.) The ’573 patent

² Citations to the specification of the ’573 patent thus apply to all asserted patents.

1 was filed on December 10, 1999, and the other three patents claim priority to it. Ceiva
2 asserts claims 2, 6, and 19 of the '573 patent, claims 1-8 and 15 of the '930 patent,
3 claims 1, 4, 11, 16-17, and 20 of the '562 patent, and claims 1-2 and 5-8 of the '656
4 patent. In its prior Order, the Court found claim 19 of the '573 patent, claim 1 of the
5 '930 patent, and claim 1 of the '562 patent representative of all claims of those
6 patents. (Ex. 1, *Ceiva Logic, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. 2:19-cv-09129 AB
7 (MAA) ("*Ceiva I*"), Dkt. No. 48 ("101 Order") at 2 n.4.)

8 The patents describe the idea of displaying images on a digital picture frame,
9 which long predates the patents. ('573 patent at 6:31-41; *see* 1:45-2:14, Fig. 1.)
10 According to the specification, both traditional picture frames and existing digital
11 picture frames required users to be in close proximity to add new photos. (*Id.* at 1:19-
12 34, 2:15-17.) The specification purports to address this problem by taking existing
13 digital picture frames and adding generic internet connectivity so that the frames can
14 automatically download photos from and be controlled by remote servers, like a
15 generic computer would do. It describes a "frame device" with a "display region
16 (e.g. an LCD) surrounded with a border region modeled to resemble a traditional
17 picture frame," which connects to a network "to periodically obtain image data from
18 a centralized repository and then display that data according to criteria established by
19 an authorized user." (*Id.* at Abstract.)

20 The asserted claims are each directed to this basic idea. For example, claim
21 19 of the '573 patent requires a "system for distributing image data" comprising (1)
22 a "digital picture frame" configured to "operate according to preferences defined by
23 a user" and "obtain an update" for its operating software, (2) a "user interface"
24 configured to "obtain image data and said preferences" from the user and provide
25 them to a server system, and (3) a "server system" configured to "periodically relay
26 said image data and said preferences" to the frame when the frame "automatically
27 issues a request for said image data." In other words, the claim is directed to a digital
28 picture frame that connects to a server system to receive photos, user preferences,

1 and software updates. Claim 2 adds that the server generates “package data”
2 representing image data and user preferences and that the frame is “configured to
3 authenticate”—*i.e.*, verify the identify of—the server system. Dependent claim 6
4 requires that input to the user interface is permitted only after the server authenticates
5 the user. The claims provide no detail about how to achieve these results—*e.g.*, how
6 the server authenticates the user, how the frame authenticates the server, how the
7 server generates and sends package data, or how the frame obtains software updates.

8 Claim 1 of the ’930 patent similarly requires a picture frame that requests and
9 displays images, authenticates a server system, and obtains software updates. It
10 requires a “digital display apparatus” that carries out a series of functions: “***an image***
11 ***display function*** configured to obtain image data”; “***a remote connection function***
12 configured to automatically initiate communications” with a server system, “send a
13 request for image data,” and “receive in response” a “set of data” with “one or more
14 image data files”; “***an authentication function*** configured to authenticate” the server
15 system “prior to accepting said set of data”; and “***a software update function***
16 configured to obtain an updated version of said onboard software” and replace the
17 “current version” of onboard software.³ The claim further requires memory with
18 “authentication information” for the server system and a “unique identifier” for the
19 apparatus. But the claims do not specify ***how*** to carry out any of the recited functions;
20 they merely claim results. For example, they do not specify how the “authentication
21 information” and “unique identifier” are generated or used. The dependent claims
22 add more results with no implementation detail: the “authentication function” sends
23 the unique identifier to the server (cl. 2) and provides “device authentication
24 information” to the server before obtaining image data (cl. 3); an “initialization
25 function” prompts the server to “associate a record” (*i.e.*, a user account) with the
26 apparatus (cl. 4); the apparatus “display[s] an account initialization message” (cl. 5)
27 that “prompts the user to create an account” (cl. 6); the “account initialization

28 ³ All emphasis added, unless otherwise noted.

1 message” is “served from” the server (cl. 15); “a timing interval” for the apparatus to
2 “automatically initiate periodic connections” with the server (cl. 7); and a “timing
3 interval” for “periodically selecting an image data file” from memory (cl. 8).

4 Claim 1 of the ’656 patent similarly requires “computer readable instructions”
5 for completing a set of generic steps: “sending a request for image data to said server
6 system,” “receiving image data and authentication information” from the server
7 system in response, “authenticating said server system,” “storing said received image
8 data” in memory, “displaying said image data,” and “receiving” and “automatically
9 updating” the “computer readable instructions” in memory. The claim further
10 requires that the device “instruct” the server—in an unspecified manner—to create a
11 generic web interface for managing the device. (’656 patent cl. 1.) The claims
12 provide no additional detail about any of these steps. The dependent claims add more
13 functional results: “causing image data previously stored in said memory to be
14 replaced with” image data received from the server system (cl. 2), and storing
15 “preference information”—including “an image display list” and “timing
16 information” specifying when to send requests for and display images (cls. 5-8).

17 Claim 1 of the ’562 patent similarly requires computer readable instructions
18 for performing the following steps: “upon connection to a power source and a
19 communications source,” sending to the server system a unique device identifier and
20 software version identifier stored in memory; prompting the user to “create an
21 account”; receiving “updated computer readable instructions” from the server
22 system; updating the instructions in memory with the updated instructions; receiving
23 “updated content” from the server system; and displaying the updated content. The
24 claims do not provide an algorithm or specify how any of these functions are
25 performed. The asserted dependent claims of the ’562 patent recite minor variations
26 on these steps: sending and receiving unspecified “authentication information” and
27 “metadata” (cls. 11, 16, 17), receiving “location information” of the apparatus (cl. 4),
28 and adding unspecified “new functionality to said apparatus” (cl. 20).

1 The specification admits that each limitation of the claims long predated the
2 patents. The recited computing components are strictly conventional. ('573 patent
3 at 10:26-11:17 (conventional processor, controller, memory, display, and
4 “telecommunication hardware and/or software”).) Existing digital picture frames
5 such as the “Sony PHD A55 CyberFrame” displayed images from a memory on an
6 LCD screen in a variety of resolutions and allowed a user to customize settings “to
7 control how data is displayed,” including “varying intervals” for displaying photos
8 in “slide show mode” and “delet[ing] unwanted images or keep[ing] certain images
9 from being deleted.”⁴ (*Id.* at 1:39-2:34; *see* '573 patent cl. 19 (“digital picture frame
10 configured to operate according to preferences defined by a user”); '930 patent cl. 8
11 (“timing interval for periodically selecting an image data file from said memory for
12 rendering”); '656 patent cls. 5, 7, 8 (“preference information for controlling the
13 display of said image data,” “the timing of displaying said image data,” and “an
14 image display list”); Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 451-76.)

15 The claimed network communications and computing processes are also
16 strictly conventional. ('573 patent at 2:38-56 (computer networks and techniques for
17 transmitting data between servers and client devices over a network), 2:62-3:23
18 (email systems that distribute data to designated recipients), 4:13-5:10 (“client pull”
19 techniques, *e.g.*, downloading data over the web), 5:36-6:6 (“server push” techniques
20 where user sets a device to periodically receive data from a server without further
21 user input), 6:6-14 (displaying graphical user interfaces and screensavers), 28:60-67
22 (existing communication protocols); *see* cl. 19 (user interface “obtain[s] image data
23 and said preferences from said user” and server system “periodically relay[s] said
24 image data and said preferences” to the frame); '930 patent cl. 1 (“a remote
25 connection function configured to automatically initiate communications with said
26

27 ⁴ Traditional picture frames that form a border around an image are also
28 admittedly conventional. ('573 patent at 1:45, cl. 19 (“a border region modeled to
resemble a picture frame designed to circumscribe printed photographs”).)

1 first remote server system”), cl. 7 (“periodic connections”); ’562 patent cl. 1 (“upon
2 connection to a power source and a communications source, initiating . . . a
3 communications session with said server system via said communications network”);
4 ’656 patent cl. 1 (“upon connection to a power source and a communications source
5 and prior to receiving any input from a user, to automatically initiate a
6 communications session with said server system”), cl. 6 (preference information
7 “specifying the timing of sending requests for image data to said server system”); Ex.
8 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 315-45 (describing network-connected display devices before
9 the patents), 346-84 (describing devices and systems that provided periodic
10 download of image data over a network before the patents).)

11 The asserted claims therefore recite generic, routine, and conventional
12 computer components and processes for performing generic functions, while adding
13 no detail about how to perform them.

14 **III. THE ASSERTED CLAIMS ARE INVALID UNDER SECTION 101.**

15 The Supreme Court directs courts to take a two-step approach in evaluating
16 patent eligibility. *Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l*, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014).
17 First, the court determines whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea. *Id.* If
18 so, the court decides whether the claims add an “inventive concept”—“an element or
19 combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
20 amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [abstract idea] itself.’” *Id.* at
21 217-18 (citation omitted). Resolving the legal issue of patent eligibility rarely
22 involves “genuine disputes over the underlying facts material to the § 101 inquiry.”
23 *Berkheimer v. HP Inc.*, 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). That is why courts
24 routinely resolve patent eligibility at summary judgment. *See, e.g., BSG Tech LLC*
25 *v. BuySeasons, Inc.*, 899 F.3d 1281, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018); *Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.*
26 *Alstom S.A.*, 830 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016); *Mrtg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice*
27 *Loan Servs. Inc.*, 811 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

A. The Court already found the idea to which the claims are directed abstract and the claimed components non-inventive.

This is the second action brought by a Ceiva entity against Amazon in this Court. The first action was filed by Ceiva’s parent company Ceiva Logic, Inc., and involved three of the four patents at issue here: the ’573, ’930, and ’562 patents (the “*Ceiva I* patents”). (Ex. 2, *Ceiva I* Dismissal Order, Dkt. No. 206.) The Court dismissed *Ceiva I* for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because, at the end of fact discovery, Ceiva Logic admitted it did not own the patents it asserted. (*Id.*) Before dismissing that case, the Court considered whether Ceiva’s patents claimed ineligible subject matter under § 101. (Ex. 1, 101 Order.)

At *Alice* Step 1, the Court noted that the purported invention “distills down to a digital picture frame able ‘to automatically access a remote data repository to obtain updated content without the use of a computer and without any further user input.’” (*Id.* at 9.) This idea “appears to be abstract and thus ineligible for patent protection” because it is comparable to the non-technological abstract idea of “compiling photos to display in succession, such as on a film projector.” (*Id.* at 9-10.) The Court noted that the claims recite components “in functional terms, rather than explaining how the components perform the function”—including, for example, claim 1 of the ’562 patent, which “requires ‘sending by said apparatus said unique identifier,’ without explaining how the unique identifier is generated or sent.” (*Id.*) The Court concluded that the claims lacked “sufficient specificity” and therefore could not be “directed to an improvement in computer functionality.” (*Id.* at 10.)

At *Alice* Step 2, the Court observed that most of the claim limitations, at least as “divorced from the context of a virtual picture frame, were routine and well-known in the art.” (*Id.* at 12.) The Court did not find that any single claimed component supplied an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patentable invention. (*Id.*) The Court nevertheless declined to invalidate the claims, identifying just one potential fact issue underlying the Step 2 inquiry: “whether the

1 ordered combination of limitations” supplied an inventive concept. (*Id.*) As
2 described below, no dispute precludes summary judgment of § 101 invalidity.

3 **B. At *Alice* Step 1, all four asserted patents claim an abstract idea.**

4 At *Alice* Step 1, courts determine whether the claims recite a specific
5 technological solution for the problem they purport to solve. *Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor*
6 *Graphics Corp.*, 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). To be non-abstract,
7 computer-implemented claims must be “directed to a specific improvement to
8 computer functionality” and not merely recite “the use of conventional or generic
9 technology in a nascent but well-known environment.” *In re TLI Commc’ns LLC*
10 *Pat. Litig.*, 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

11 Here, as the Court correctly concluded, the claims of the ’573, ’930, and ’562
12 patents are directed to the abstract “idea of a digital picture frame automatically
13 accessing a remote data repository,” rather than any improvement to computing
14 technology. (Ex. 1, 101 Order at 9-10.) Each asserted claim requires a digital picture
15 frame or display device—admittedly well-known at the time the patents—that
16 connects to generic servers to obtain images. Certain claims also require obtaining
17 user preferences or software updates—again, conventional functionality.⁵ (*See, e.g.*,
18 ’573 patent cl. 19 (“system for distributing image data comprising” a “digital picture
19 frame” and a “user interface” coupled to a server system that allows users to upload
20 photos and set preferences, where the server system provides image data, user
21 preferences, and updates to the operating system); ’930 patent cl. 1 (“digital display
22 apparatus” that automatically connects to a server and obtains updates to onboard
23 software and images); ’562 patent cl. 1 (“apparatus for displaying content comprising
24 image data” that connects to a server and receives updated content and computer
25

26 ⁵ The Court agreed that claim 19 of the ’573 patent, claim 1 of the ’930 patent,
27 and claim 1 of the ’562 patent were representative of all claims in those patents. (Ex.
28 1, 101 Order at 2 n.4.) The Court can consider representative claims rather than
analyzing each claim separately. *See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v.*
Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

1 readable instructions for controlling the apparatus).) As the Court observed, this idea
2 is no different than “the abstract idea of compiling photos to display in succession,
3 such as on a film projector,” applied to the well-known environment of a digital
4 picture frame. (Ex. 1, 101 Order at 10.)

5 Certain claims require that the frame device include a “unique identifier” and
6 either authenticate, or be authenticated by, a connected server, or that the user is
7 authenticated. (E.g., ’573 patent cl. 2 (frame device authenticates server system), cl.
8 6 (server system authenticates a user); ’930 patent cls. 1, 11 (authentication function
9 to authenticate remote server system), cls. 2, 3 (display apparatus provides
10 authentication information to server system); ’562 patent cl. 16 (apparatus transmits
11 authentication information to server system), cl. 17 (apparatus receives
12 authentication information from server system); ’656 patent cl. 1 (display device
13 receives authentication from, and authenticates, a server system).) But they recite no
14 specific algorithm for the claimed authentication, such as a way of using a unique
15 identifier to authenticate a device. Merely claiming the *idea* of authentication is not
16 a specific technological solution as a matter of law. *Secured Mail Sols. LLC v.*
17 *Universal Wilde, Inc.*, 873 F.3d 905, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (claims directed to
18 identifying a message sender using unique identifiers were abstract because they did
19 not recite any “specific details” about how the unique identifier is generated or used),
20 *cert. denied*, 138 S. Ct. 2000 (2018); *PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google LLC*, 8
21 F.4th 1310, 1315–19 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (using unique “identifiers” to retrieve, delete,
22 or control access to data items “doesn’t transfigure an idea out of the realm of
23 abstraction”).⁶

24
25 ⁶ See also *Elec. Comm’n Techs., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.com, LLC*, 958 F.3d
26 1178, 1181-83 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (claimed functions of “enabling a first party to input
27 authentication information, storing the authentication information, and providing the
28 authentication information” are abstract and ineligible); *Bridge & Post, Inc. v.*
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 778 F. App’x 882, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (claim reciting
“receiving network traffic, adding a ‘tag’ that identifies the user or client computer,
and sending that traffic onward” was abstract and ineligible).

1 The Court’s observations regarding the *Ceiva I* patents apply with equal force
2 to the asserted claims of the ’656 patent, which shares a common specification with
3 and is related to the *Ceiva I* patents.⁷ The claims of that patent are directed to the
4 same basic idea, implemented using a “display device” that connects to generic
5 servers. (’656 patent cl. 1.) Like the *Ceiva I* patents, the ’656 patent claims existing,
6 generic, and conventional computer components, operating in a conventional
7 manner: a “display device” that “automatically initiate[s] a communications session”
8 with a server system to request and receive image data, authenticates the server
9 system, stores and displays received image data, obtains software updates, and
10 instructs the server to create a user interface for managing the device. (*Id.*)

11 Courts have repeatedly concluded that similar results-focused and functional
12 claims are abstract. In *TLI*, the Federal Circuit invalidated claims directed to
13 capturing and storing digital images on a mobile phone, transmitting the images and
14 classification information such as dates and timestamps from the phone to a server,
15 and storing them on the server. 823 F.3d at 610-13. These claims were drawn to the
16 abstract idea of classifying and storing data in an organized manner, and merely used
17 generic mobile phones and servers as an environment to carry out that abstract idea.
18 *Id.* at 611-13. In *Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc.*, the Federal Circuit
19 invalidated claims drawn to the abstract idea of “delivering media content to a
20 handheld electronic device.” 838 F.3d 1266, 1269-71 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Affinity’s
21 claims did “no more than describe a desired function or outcome, without providing
22 any limiting detail that confine[d] the claim to a particular solution to an identified
23 problem.” *Id.* at 1269. The claimed components—a customized user interface and
24 streaming requested data over a network—were “claimed generically rather than with
25 the specificity necessary to show how those components provide[d] a concrete

26
27 ⁷ See *CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.*, 717 F.3d 1269, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
28 (claims from the same patent family that recite the same abstract idea “in the same
or similar terms” warrant “similar substantive treatment under Section 101”), *aff’d*,
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).

1 solution to the problem addressed by the patent.” *Id.* at 1269, 1271.

2 Ceiva’s claims are no different. They claim a generic frame device that obtains
3 images and software updates⁸ from a generic server, and recite no specific
4 improvement to computer functionality. The claims fail Step 1 because they are not
5 directed to “a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology,” but
6 are “directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke
7 generic processes and machinery.” *Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.*, 842 F.3d 1229,
8 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

9 **C. At Alice Step 2, the asserted claims recite no inventive concept.**

10 At Step 2, the Court considers “the elements of each claim both individually
11 and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether they contain an “‘inventive
12 concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible
13 application.” *Alice*, 573 U.S. at 217-18, 221 (citation omitted). Neither generic
14 computer technology, nor “well-understood, routine, conventional” components and
15 activities, nor “purely functional” elements can supply the required inventive
16 concept. *Id.* at 221-26 (citation omitted).

17 As the Court correctly found in *Ceiva I*, the specification itself admits that the
18 various computing and networking components recited in the claims were well-
19 known, routine, and conventional at the time of the patents. (Ex. 1, 101 Order at 13;
20 Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 461-76.) This is undisputed.⁹

21
22 ⁸ The idea of receiving and automatically updating software is not a technological
23 solution either. *MyMail, Ltd. v. ooVoo, LLC*, No. 2020-1825, 2021 WL 3671364, at
24 *5 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2021) (claims directed to receiving update data from a server
25 and automatically “updating toolbar software” on a device were abstract and not an
26 improvement in computer functionality); *Intell. Ventures I, LLC v. Motorola Mobility
LLC*, 81 F. Supp. 3d 356, 366-67 (D. Del. 2015) (claims reciting sending software
updates from remote computer to user station and automatically installing them were
“directed to the abstract idea of distributing software updates to a computer”).

27 ⁹ Indeed, both Dr. Easttom and the patents’ inventor Mr. Schiller admit that the
28 claimed hardware components—a processor, controller, memory, and display—were
conventional. (Ex. 11, Easttom Dep. at 182:11-13, 191:18-192:9, 215:12-24; Ex. 8,
Schiller Dep. at 56:18-58:2, 89:22-23, 90:23-91:16; SUF 8-13, 27, 33.)

1 The basic computing concepts and processes recited in the claims are also non-
2 inventive as a matter of law. Indeed, courts have routinely found that claims directed
3 to controlling remote devices over a network using conventional computing and
4 networking components fail to recite an inventive concept at Step 2. In *ChargePoint,*
5 *Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc.*, the Federal Circuit held that the idea of a server that
6 controls network-connected electric vehicle charging stations by receiving and
7 evaluating charging requests and instructing stations to apply or modify electricity
8 flow is not an inventive concept that transforms the abstract idea of “communicating
9 over a network for device interaction”—a “building block of the modern
10 economy”—into a patentable invention. 920 F.3d 759, 773-74 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The
11 ability to control devices remotely “mirrors the abstract idea itself and thus cannot
12 supply an inventive concept.” *Id.*; see also *EscapeX IP LLC v. Block, Inc.*, 652 F.
13 Supp. 3d 396, 403, 406-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (no inventive concept in claimed method
14 of “updat[ing] content on an album stored on a user device, without the user’s
15 intervention”); (Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 285-92, 304-09 (describing conventional
16 processes for client-server communication over a network), 315-45 (describing
17 network-connected display devices before the patents), 346-84 (describing devices
18 and systems that provided periodic download of image data over a network before
19 the patents); SUF 14-20, 22, 33-35.)

20 Automatically updating software is also non-inventive. *MyMail, Ltd.*, 2021
21 WL 3671364, at *7 (no inventive concept in steps of “sending information from a
22 user device to a server, determining at the server whether the user device should
23 receive toolbar update data, receiving at the user device the update data,” and
24 “updating the toolbar”); *Motorola Mobility*, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 366-67 (no inventive
25 concept in “presenting a directory of software updates at a user station,” “selecting
26 and transmitting the desired software updates,” and “receiving the requested software
27 updates” from a server); (Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 422-33 (describing systems that
28 had over-the-network software updates before the patents); SUF 34.)

Courts have also held that claims directed to generic authentication fail to supply an inventive concept at Step 2. In *Prism Technologies LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.*, the Federal Circuit found no inventive concept in claims directed to a server that authenticates a device based on “identity data” such as its “hardware identifier” before providing access to resources, using “generic computer components employed in a customary manner.” 696 F. App’x 1014, 1017-18 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In that case, the Federal Circuit found that hardware identifiers associated with devices, and the practice of using them for authentication, were both “conventional” and not an inventive concept. *Id.* The asserted claims here similarly recite that the device and server exchange unspecified “authentication information” and a “unique identifier,” but provide no detail as to **how** authentication is carried out. (*E.g.*, ’930 patent cls. 1, 2; ’562 patent cl. 16, 17.) This generic process is non-inventive as a matter of law. *Prism*, 696 F. App’x at 1018; (*see* Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 385-421 (describing methods for client devices and servers to authenticate each other, including through use of unique identifiers, that predate the patents); SUF 31, 36-37.)¹⁰

Furthermore, courts have held that claims reciting generic user account creation and management processes lack an inventive concept. *Intell. Ventures I LLC v. AT&T Mobility II LLC*, 235 F. Supp.3d 577, 589-90, 593-94 (D. Del. 2016) (claims directed to “allowing a customer to manage his or her account” ineligible because “facilitating customer access and control over services” is “an inherent part of any provision of services, regardless of whether the services are computer-based”); (*see* Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 434-48 (describing user account creation and management processes predating the patents); SUF 38.)

Nor do the claims recite an inventive ordered combination. To overcome Step 2, an ordered combination must yield an “unexpected result”—that is, more than the

¹⁰ *See also Universal Secure Reg. LLC v. Apple Inc.*, 10 F.4th 1342, 1352, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (no inventive concept in claim directed a combination of known authentication techniques, including based on “secret information known to the user” and an account identifier), *cert. denied*, 142 S. Ct. 2707 (2022).

1 expected sum of the individual elements—that “transform[s] the abstract idea into
2 patentable subject matter.” *Universal Secure Reg.*, 10 F.4th at 1353, 1357-58. The
3 asserted claims combine conventional computing and networking processes in the
4 order in which they must be performed, to achieve nothing more than the expected
5 result of the sum of the components. (Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 475-76.) For
6 example, to allow a user to provide images and preferences to the frame device
7 remotely, the user must access a user interface to submit that information. (*Id.*) The
8 user must be authenticated *before* it is permitted to access a protected resource such
9 as this user interface, not after. (*Id.* ¶¶ 434-48); *Prism Techs.*, 696 F. App’x at 1017-
10 18. To remotely deliver images, preferences, and software updates to the device, it
11 must connect to servers that can provide that information. (Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep.
12 ¶¶ 475-76.) In any client-initiated communication—admittedly well-known at the
13 time of the patents—the client device must request data before receiving it. (*Id.*; ’573
14 patent at 4:13-19.) And it was conventional for client devices to authenticate a server
15 before accepting and storing data from the server, not after. (Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep.
16 ¶¶ 401, 406; *see* ’573 patent cl. 2; ’930 patent cl. 1.) There is nothing inventive about
17 this combination. *Universal Secure Reg.*, 10 F.4th at 1351-53.

18 Ceiva argues that the purportedly “inventive” concept of the patents is “a
19 digital picture frame that initiates requests and receives content[] it needs as
20 determined by the server.” (Ex. 7, Ceiva Interrog. Resps. at 143-144.) As an initial
21 matter, this cannot be an inventive concept because Ceiva does not contend that any
22 asserted claim requires the server to determine the content the frame device needs.
23 (Ex. 10, Edwards Dep. (Vol. 2) at 170:23-171:13); *see, e.g., Chargepoint*, 920 F.3d
24 at 769 (inventive concept must be recited in the claim). In any event, it is undisputed
25 that digital picture frames predate the patents. (Ex. 11, Easttom Dep. at 55:22-56:2;
26 SUF 1-6.) And the specification admits that conventional network communication
27 techniques allowed a user to inform a server of the type of data to send to a client
28

1 device and how often it should be sent.¹¹ ('573 patent at 5:46-6:13 (daily stock
2 market quotes sent to client devices); SUF 17-20.) Thus, the idea that a frame device
3 initiates a request for data and relies on the server to determine what content is needed
4 is not inventive. (Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 473-474); *see, e.g., Bridge & Post*, 778
5 F. App'x at 893 (claims reciting receiving network traffic at a server, adding a tag
6 that identifies the user, and sending that traffic onward to facilitate targeted
7 advertising were drawn to abstract idea of "transmitting information" and non-
8 inventive).¹²

9 Ceiva next argues that the patents "eliminated the complexities" of existing
10 digital picture frames by combining "a unique identifier stored in memory, a frame
11 that initiates communications with the server, and a server that automatically
12 distributes updated content to the frame." (Ex. 7, Ceiva Interrog. Resps. at 144.) But,
13 yet again, none of the asserted claims requires a server to "automatically" distribute
14 updated content to the frame device. Even if the claims did recite this specific
15 combination, it would not be inventive. The specification admits that client-initiated
16 communication was conventional and widely used, including in the HTTP protocol
17 used for web traffic. ('573 patent at 4:13-5:10.) It further admits that many
18 broadcast-style information delivery systems were available at the time. (*Id.* at 5:46-
19 6:13.) In these systems, a user would select channels to subscribe to, and the client
20 would periodically request updated content from the server over the Internet at user-
21 configurable intervals, without further user input. (*Id.*; Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep.
22 ¶¶ 370-75; SUF 18-20, 33, 35.) There is no dispute that it was also conventional for
23 a computer to store a unique identifier such as its serial number. (Ex. 11, Easttom

24
25 ¹¹ Although these broadcast-style techniques are sometimes called "server push,"
26 it was common for commercial products at the time to have the client initiate a
27 request to the server at the specified interval, to which the server would respond with
28 updated data. (*E.g., Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 370-75.*)

¹² *See Elec. Power Grp.*, 830 F.3d at 1353 (claims that "specify what information
it is desirable to gather, analyze, and display" using "conventional, generic
technology" lack an inventive concept).

1 Dep. at 189:2-3; SUF 31.)¹³

2 Ceiva’s purported combination simply applies conventional networking
3 functions—client-initiated communication and storage of a unique device
4 identifier—in the environment of a digital picture frame made of generic computer
5 components. (’573 patent at 10:36-11:17.) The purported result of this combination
6 is an expected one that was widely available as of the date of the patents: the client
7 device receives data from a server that tells the device what to display and how to
8 behave. (E.g., ’573 patent at 4:13-5:10, 5:36-6:13.) This is not an inventive concept.
9 (Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 475-77); see *Bridge & Post*, 778 F. App’x at 893.

10 **D. Ceiva cannot avoid summary judgment with its expert testimony.**

11 None of the opinions offered by Ceiva’s validity expert, Dr. Easttom, change
12 the conclusion that the asserted claims are ineligible under § 101. As an initial
13 matter, his testimony is irrelevant at *Alice* Step 1 because that is an issue of law that
14 can be resolved based on the intrinsic evidence alone. *CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic,*
15 *Inc.*, 955 F.3d 1358, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Moreover, for many of his opinions, Dr.
16 Easttom simply regurgitates large portions of the patents and asserts in conclusory
17 fashion that they are “directed to novel and unconventional improvements on existing
18 technologies.” (Ex. 6, Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶¶ 220-83.) Such conclusory testimony
19 does not create a genuine dispute to prevent summary judgment as a matter of law.
20 *Regents of Univ. of Minnesota v. AGA Med. Corp.*, 717 F.3d 929, 941 (Fed. Cir.
21 2013); *Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC*, 516 F.3d 993, 101 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

22 Dr. Easttom’s more specific contentions regarding ineligibility lack merit. He
23 contends the claims are not abstract because they recite a physical device and system
24 in the real world. (Ex. 6, Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶ 279.) This argument fails: the “mere
25 recitation of concrete, tangible components is insufficient to confer patent eligibility
26

27 ¹³ As Amazon’s expert Dr. Johnson explains, the concept of a unique identifier
28 that can be used to authenticate a device is as old as computer networking itself.
(E.g., Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 265, 307-09, 387-88.)

1 to an otherwise abstract idea.” *TLI*, 823 F.3d at 612.

2 Dr. Easttom asserts that the patents enable a digital picture frame¹⁴ to do things
3 it could not do before: communicate with a remote server and update its images,
4 settings, and software without the physical presence of a user. (Ex. 6, Easttom Reb.
5 Rep. ¶¶ 220-21, 251; *see also* ¶ 233 (opining that the patents allow a device to initiate
6 communication with a server “upon connection to a power source and
7 communications source and without any additional input from a user”).) But the
8 claims merely recite the idea of initiating communications with a server
9 “automatically”; they do not specify **how** to achieve this result. (’930 patent cl. 1;
10 ’656 patent cl. 1); *Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC*, 838 F.3d 1253, 1260
11 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (lack of implementation detail for claimed inventive concept renders
12 claim ineligible). As explained above, the specification **admits** that before the
13 patents, devices periodically requested content from a server without a user present.¹⁵
14 (’573 patent at 5:46-6:13; Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 290-92, 370-84, 429-33.)

15 Dr. Easttom also admits that devices predating the patents were designed to
16 self-configure, *i.e.*, required no user input to set up, other than plugging it in. (Ex.
17 11, Easttom Dep. at 112:18-113:19 (Windows 95 and 98 operating systems were
18 designed to be self-configuring, and successfully self-configured at least
19 “sometimes”); Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 307-09, 387; Ex. 4, Johnson Reb. Rep. ¶¶
20 42-49; SUF 39.) Moreover, the asserted claims recite only the **result** of self-
21 configuration, without specifying **how**. (*E.g.*, ’656 patent cl. 1; ’562 patent cl. 1.)

22
23 ¹⁴ Only the ’573 patent claims recite a “digital picture frame” or “frame device.”
24 (’573 patent, claims 1, 2, 19.) The other three patents claim a generic “display
25 device,” “digital display apparatus,” and “apparatus.” (’656 patent cl. 1; ’930 patent
cls. 1, 11; ’562 patent cl. 1.)

26 ¹⁵ Ceiva did not invent the concept of storing data on remote servers. (Ex. 11,
27 Easttom Dep. at 217:1-3, 237:8-20, 239:13-20; *see* 106:20-22 (systems that
28 distributed image data predate the patents), 139:13-21 (websites were conventional);
see also Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 367-84.) Dr. Easttom further admits that prior
to the patents, devices running Windows 98 could obtain updated software from a
remote server over a network. (Ex. 11, Easttom Dep. at 57:15-58:20.)

1 The Federal Circuit has found similar claims abstract and non-inventive. *Tranxition,*
2 *Inc. v. Lenovo, Inc.*, 664 F. App’x 968, 971-72 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (invalidating claims
3 directed to abstract idea of “automatic migration” of user-specified “configuration
4 settings” from one computer to another).

5 Dr. Easttom next contends that the claims make digital picture frames less
6 expensive because they require less memory and processing power. (Ex. 6, Easttom
7 Reb. Rep. ¶¶ 226, 234.) But the *claims* do not identify any particular means of
8 achieving this result; they merely recite conventional memory and processors. Dr.
9 Easttom attributes this purported benefit to the fact that the display device “obtain[s]
10 both image data and preferences for the device *from network sources*.” (Ex. 6,
11 Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶¶ 226, 234, 266.) But the specification admits that “techniques
12 for propagating data to devices connected to the network” were conventional. (’573
13 patent at 2:47-56.) The idea of a device communicating with a server is a
14 conventional computing feature, not a technical solution. *Chargepoint*, 920 F.3d at
15 773-74; (see Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 285-92, 304-09, 315-84).¹⁶

16 That the claimed frame device obtains photos “without use of a separate
17 computer to transfer such data” is also not a technological solution. (Ex. 6, Easttom
18 Reb. Rep. ¶¶ 225.) The claimed frame device is itself a generic computer—it has a
19 generic processor, memory, and display screen. (E.g., ’656 patent cl. 1.) The
20 specification admits that existing digital picture frames had these components, and
21 merely asserts that they did not connect to a network. (’573 patent at 1:39-2:44 (prior
22 art frame had “LCD screen,” “memory medium,” and “control mechanism” to
23 “control how data is displayed”).) Adding generic internet connectivity to a generic
24 computing device is not a technical solution. *Chargepoint*, 920 F.3d at 773-74.

25 ¹⁶ Dr. Easttom asserts that the claimed device obviates the need for additional
26 memory and computing power by saving “authentication information” and a “unique
27 identifier” in memory, allowing it to securely communicate with servers. (Ex. 6,
28 Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶¶ 251, 274.) But the claims recite only generic “memory” and
do not specify how data is stored. The generic ability to securely communicate with
a server is not a technical solution. *Universal Secure Reg.*, 10 F.4th at 1351-53.

1 Contrary to Dr. Easttom’s assertion, the idea of a device and server
2 authenticating each other does not make the claims any less abstract. (Ex. 6, Easttom
3 Reb. Rep. ¶¶ 228.) The claims only recite the functional result of authentication,
4 without disclosing any specific solution for it. (E.g., ’656 patent cl.1 (display device
5 receives “authentication information” from, and authenticates, a server).)¹⁷ Indeed,
6 as Dr. Easttom admits, protocols for clients and servers to verify each other’s identity
7 were conventional at the time of the patents. (Ex. 11, Easttom Dep. at 152:22-153:3,
8 153:17-24, 154:14-23, 243:19-244:5; see Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 385-421; SUF
9 36-37.)¹⁸ Merely proclaiming that a device authenticates a server is not a technical
10 solution. *Universal Secure Reg.*, 10 F.4th at 1351-53.

11 Dr. Easttom further asserts that the patents eliminate the need for certain
12 manual user input. (E.g., Ex. 6, Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶¶ 227, 255, 266.) But the
13 asserted claims merely proclaim that the device performs certain functions
14 “automatically” without providing any detail about how to achieve this result. See
15 *supra* Section II. This is not a technical solution. *D&M Holdings v. Sonos, Inc.*, 309
16 F. Supp. 3d 207, 214 (D. Del. 2018) (“automation of a process” that was performed
17 by humans does not make claims less abstract); *Secured Mail*, 873 F.3d at 910
18 (making “a process more efficient” does not make claims less abstract).

19 At Step 2, Dr. Easttom rehashes the same opinions he offered for Step 1,
20 identifying combinations that were purportedly not well-known *in digital picture*
21 *frames*. (E.g., Ex. 6, Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶¶ 284-286.) Dr. Easttom’s Step 2 opinions
22 fail for the same reasons as his Step 1 opinions. Dr. Easttom asserts in conclusory
23

24 ¹⁷ Nor is there any improvement to computer functionality in the idea that the
25 device “instruct[s] said server system to create an interface accessible by a web
26 browser for managing behavior characteristics of said display device.” (’656 patent
27 cl. 1; see, Ex. 6, Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶ 231.) The claims recite this idea in purely
28 functional, result-oriented terms. (’656 patent cl. 1.)

¹⁸ Dr. Easttom further admits that device serial numbers were used as unique
identifiers long before the asserted patents. (Ex. 11, Easttom Dep. at 189:2-3; see
Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 265, 307-09, 387-88.)

1 fashion that no prior art **digital picture frame** connected to a network, had a remote
2 user interface, and could be controlled remotely. (*E.g.*, *id.* ¶¶ 297, 286.) But novelty
3 and patent eligibility are “distinct”; “a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract
4 idea.” *Synopsys*, 839 F.3d at 1151.¹⁹ Moreover, setting aside that not all claims even
5 recite a digital picture frame, the specification **admits** there is nothing inventive about
6 client-server communication over a network. (’573 patent at 2:45-56.) Ceiva did not
7 invent the concept of storing data on remote servers. (Ex. 11, Easttom Dep. at 237:8-
8 20; SUF 28-29.) Nor is it inventive to assert that a user can control what a device
9 displays by interacting with a generic remote user interface. The claims only recite
10 the **result** of a remote user interface without providing any detail about how to
11 achieve it. (*E.g.*, ’573 patent cl. 19.) There is no inventive concept in the idea that a
12 digital picture frame made of generic computer components can be controlled
13 remotely using generic communication processes. *Chargpoint*, 920 F.3d at 773-74.

14 Dr. Easttom’s assertion that Amazon did not identify a prior art memory that
15 stored “a combination of image data files, authentication information for a remote
16 server, and a unique identifier for a digital display device,” is likewise irrelevant
17 because this argument conflates purported novelty with patent eligibility. (Ex. 6,
18 Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶ 304.) Moreover, the claims provide no detail about the
19 “authentication information” and “unique identifier.” The idea of storing these
20 generic data types on a generic memory cannot be an inventive concept. *Elec. Power*
21 *Grp.*, 830 F.3d at 1353 (no inventive concept in claims that “specify what information
22 it is desirable to gather” using generic technology); (*see* Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep.
23 ¶¶ 265-66, 307-09, 387-89, 411, 419-21; Ex. 4, Johnson Reb. Rep. ¶ 45.)²⁰

24
25 ¹⁹ *See Solutran, Inc. v. Elavon, Inc.*, 931 F.3d 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
26 (“merely reciting an abstract idea by itself in a claim—even if the idea is novel and
non-obvious—is not enough to save it from ineligibility”).

27 ²⁰ Dr. Easttom’s reliance on purported “industry praise” of Ceiva’s digital picture
28 frame is unavailing. First, it is undisputed that the Ceiva frame does not practice the
’656 patent claims. (Ex. 5, Edwards Rep. ¶¶ 752-756.) Second, the purported

1 Dr. Easttom contends that a “server system providing operating system
2 updates, images, [and] preferences” to a digital photo frame required complex
3 architecture. (Ex. 6, Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶ 303.) But the patents neither claim nor
4 describe such an architecture; none of the server architecture components Dr.
5 Easttom cites—proxy servers, load balancers, registration server, data repository—
6 are recited in the claims. The claims recite only a generic “server system” or “remote
7 server system,” neither of which is inventive. (Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶¶ 285-92.)

8 None of Dr. Easttom’s opinions changes the conclusion that the asserted patent
9 claims are abstract and non-inventive, and thus ineligible as a matter of law.

10 **IV. THE ACCUSED PRODUCTS DO NOT INFRINGE CEIVA’S CLAIMS**
11 **REQUIRING SERVER AUTHENTICATION.**

12 **A. Ceiva disclaimed server authentication using the SSL protocol.**

13 The Secure Sockets Layer protocol (“SSL”) is a prior art security protocol that
14 specifies a process for a client to authenticate the server with which it is
15 communicating—that is, verify the identity of the server—among other features.
16 (Ex. 3, Johnson Op. Rep. ¶ 397; Ex. 6, Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶ 928; Ex. 14, SSL 3.0
17 Specification at DJ00000187; SUF 41.) During prosecution of the ’930 patent, the
18 patent examiner rejected the then-pending claims as obvious over U.S. Patent No.
19 6,721,713 (“Guheen”), which disclosed and incorporated by reference the SSL
20 protocol. (Ex. 12, ’930 patent file history (“’930 FH”) at Ceiva-A 00006172-73,
21 6177; Ex. 13, Guheen at 183:17-24, 254:24-36, Figs. 26C, 29B; SUF 42, 45-46.) To
22 overcome this rejection, Ceiva told the patent examiner that the SSL protocol did not
23 meet the server authentication limitations of the pending claims. (Ex. 12, ’930 FH at

24 _____
25 “praise” was not related to any technological improvement. It relates to the abstract
26 idea itself—a digital picture frame that automatically obtains images from a server.
27 (E.g., Ex. 6, Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶¶ 489 (the frame “displays [photos] like a slide
28 show”)); *Island Intell. Prop. LLC v. TD Ameritrade, Inc.*, No. 21-CV-00273, 2022
WL 17546958, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2022) (praise for innovation in “cash
management,” an abstract idea, does not create a material dispute), *report and
recommendation adopted*, 2022 WL 17080738 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2022).

1 Ceiva-A 00006196; SUF 47-49.) Ceiva explained:

2 As known to those of ordinary skill in the art, SSL is used to encrypt and
3 provide secure communications between two communicating entities “to
4 prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery” (see, e.g.
5 RFC6101, available, e.g., at <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6101>). It does not
6 comprise a “an authentication function configured to authenticate said first
remote server system prior to accepting said set of data from said first
remote server system” as claimed in independent claims 85 and 105.

7 (Ex. 12, '930 FH at Ceiva-A 00006196 (emphasis in original).) Ceiva then amended
8 one of the two independent claims to add an unrelated “software update function,”
9 and the examiner allowed the claims. (*Id.* at Ceiva-A 00006208–6211; SUF 50-51.)

10 **B. Ceiva cannot prevail on infringement because it disclaimed the**
11 **authentication protocols it now accuses.**

12 The doctrine of prosecution disclaimer forecloses Ceiva’s infringement theory
13 as to server authentication. That doctrine “preclud[es] patentees from recapturing,”
14 through an infringement claim, “specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.”
15 *Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.*, 856 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation
16 omitted); *TMC Fuel Injection Sys., LLC v. Ford Motor Co.*, 682 F. App’x 895, 899
17 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The doctrine reflects the commonsense notion that a patentee
18 cannot “obtain allowance” of claims by interpreting them narrowly during
19 prosecution and then apply the claims “in a different way against accused infringers.”
20 *Aylus*, 856 F.3d at 1360 (citation omitted).

21 Yet, that is exactly what Ceiva has done here. Several asserted claims require
22 that the frame device “authenticate” or verify the identity of the server system with
23 which it communicates—*e.g.*, to receive user preferences and images. ('930 patent,
24 cls. 1, 11 (memory of the digital display apparatus contains onboard software
25 comprising “an authentication function configured *to authenticate said first remote*
26 *server system*”); 573 patent, cl. 2 (the frame device is “configured *to authenticate*
27 *said at least one server system*”); '656 patent, cl. 1 (memory of the display device
28 contains computer readable instructions for causing the device “to automatically

1 initiate a communications session with said server system” which includes a step of
2 “**authenticating said server system**”); ’562 patent, cl. 17 (computer readable
3 instructions in the memory of the apparatus “comprise instructions for causing said
4 apparatus to **receive authentication information from said server system**.”).)

5 Ceiva alleges that the accused Amazon products authenticate servers using the
6 Transport Layer Security (“TLS”) protocol, and that the server certificates received
7 by these products during TLS server authentication are the “authentication
8 information” of claim 17 of the ’562 patent. (Ex. 5, Edwards Rep. ¶¶ 261, 558, 564,
9 569.) But TLS is merely a version of the disclaimed SSL protocol. (Ex. 3, Johnson
10 Op. Rep. ¶ 399; SUF 52-54.) In 1999, the Internet Engineering Task Force took over
11 development of new versions of SSL from Netscape, renaming it TLS. (Ex. 4,
12 Johnson Reb. Rep. ¶ 272 & n.20). The name change reflected the change in the
13 governing body, not any technical difference between the protocols. (Ex. 17, *Security*
14 *Standards and Name Changes in the Browser Wars*; SUF 54.) Indeed, it is
15 **undisputed** that SSL and TLS provide nearly identical mechanisms for clients to
16 authenticate servers; Ceiva’s expert Dr. Edwards admits this. (Ex. 9, Edwards Dep.
17 (Vol. 1) at 59:23-60:6; Ex. 4, Johnson Reb. Rep. ¶¶ 272-76; SUF 63-68.) In fact, Dr.
18 Edwards himself authored an article describing SSL as “a Transport-Layer Security
19 (TLS) standard.” (Ex. 18, Edwards Article at 1.) Ceiva’s validity expert, Dr.
20 Easttom, likewise treats SSL and TLS as identical in his analysis of prior art. (Ex. 6,
21 Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶¶ 927-38; SUF 67.) Therefore, there is no dispute that SSL and
22 TLS are the same for purposes of analyzing Ceiva’s infringement allegations.

23 There can also be no reasonable dispute that Ceiva disclaimed server
24 authentication using SSL, and thus TLS as well. During prosecution, the Examiner
25 rejected Ceiva’s then-pending claims because Guheen disclosed the claimed server
26 authentication. (Ex. 12, ’930 FH at Ceiva-A 00006177; SUF 45-46.) To overcome
27 this rejection, Ceiva stated unequivocally that the SSL protocol, which Guheen
28 described and incorporated, “does not comprise a ‘an authentication function

1 configured to authenticate said first remote server system prior to accepting said set
2 of data from said first remote server system” as claimed in Ceiva’s then-pending
3 claims. (Ex. 12, ’930 FH at Ceiva-A 00006196 (emphasis in original); SUF 48.)

4 Dr. Easttom asserts, in conclusory fashion, that Ceiva disclaimed only the
5 **encryption** portion of SSL, and not authentication. (Ex. 6, Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶ 189.)
6 This argument fails and lacks support in the prosecution history.²¹ It is undisputed
7 that the Guheen prior art reference, which Ceiva sought to overcome, disclosed and
8 incorporated by reference the **entire** SSL standard specification, and which describes
9 in detail both authentication and encryption methods. (Ex. 13, Guheen at 183:17-24;
10 SUF 41, 46.) Indeed, in its response to the Examiner, Ceiva stated that “neither the
11 portions of Guheen cited by the Examiner, **nor any other portion** of Guheen,
12 [discloses] the authentication function claimed in” Ceiva’s then-pending claims. (Ex.
13 12, ’930 FH at Ceiva-A 00006193; SUF 47-49.) Ceiva even included a hyperlink to
14 the SSL standard specification, which undisputedly includes authentication methods.
15 (Ex. 12, ’930 FH at Ceiva-A 00006196; SUF 48.) Therefore, Ceiva categorically
16 disclaimed the entire SSL protocol, including the **authentication** methods.

17 The Federal Circuit’s decision in *TMC* is instructive. 682 F. App’x at 898-
18 900. Upon review of the prosecution history, the district court had found that the
19 patentee had disclaimed fuel injection systems that use “pressure regulators” and,
20 based on that disclaimer, granted summary judgment of non-infringement. *Id.* On
21 appeal, TMC argued that “any disclaimer of pressure regulators only applies to a
22 particular type of pressure regulator . . . based on how pressure regulators were
23 purportedly defined during prosecution.” *Id.* at 899. The Federal Circuit rejected
24 this argument, citing TMC’s “numerous categorical disavowals” that were not
25 limited to any particular type of pressure regulator. *Id.*

26 The facts here are similar. Ceiva argues that its disclaimer of SSL was narrow,

27
28 ²¹ Dr. Easttom’s argument also fails because the pending claims did not claim any
encryption function. (Ex. 12, ’930 FH at Ceiva-A 00006112, 6114; SUF 43-44.)

1 citing a few words in the prosecution history, but this does not change its categorical
2 statements that Guheen, and the SSL authentication methods it expressly
3 incorporated, did not disclose the claimed server authentication function.
4 Furthermore, Ceiva admits that the four asserted patents claim the same “capability
5 of server authentication.” (Ex. 6, Easttom Reb. Rep. ¶ 127.) Because all four patents
6 share a common specification and are related, the same disclaimer necessarily applies
7 to the server authentication claim limitations of the ’573, ’562, and ’656 patents.
8 *Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc.*, 357 F.3d 1340, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
9 (disclaimer applies to earlier- and later-issued patents with common specification).
10 The Court should grant summary judgment of non-infringement.

11 **C. The accused products do not infringe the ’656 patent claims.**

12 The accused products do not infringe any asserted claims of the ’656 patent
13 for the independent reason that they do not receive “authentication information” in
14 response a request for image data. Claim 1 of the ’656 patent requires: (1) “***sending***
15 ***a request*** for image data to said server system,” (2) “receiving image data and
16 ***authentication information*** from said server system ***in response to said request*** [for
17 image data],” and (3) “***authenticating said server system.***” Ceiva maps the claimed
18 “authentication information” to the certificate sent by a server to the accused products
19 during the initial TLS authentication process. (Ex. 5, Edwards Rep. ¶¶ 458, 469,
20 480.) But it is undisputed that the accused products do not receive this certificate
21 from a server system “***in response to***” a request for image data: as Dr. Edwards
22 admits, the server sends its certificate, and the accused product checks a signature on
23 the certificate to verify the server’s identity, ***before*** it sends any request for data to
24 the server. (*Id.* ¶¶ 262-63; Ex. 4, Johnson Reb. Rep. ¶¶ 281-85; SUF 71.) The
25 accused products therefore cannot infringe as a matter of law.

26 **V. CONCLUSION**

27 For the foregoing reasons, Amazon respectfully requests that the Court grant
28 summary judgment of invalidity and non-infringement as set forth above.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that all counsel of record are being served with a copy of the foregoing document and accompanying exhibits via the Court’s CM/ECF system on November 22, 2023.

/s/ Ravi Ranganath

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